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Abstract
High-performance work practices are frequently considered to have positive
eects on corporate performance, but what do they do for employees? After
showing that organizational innovation is indeed positively associated with rm
performance, we investigate whether high-involvement work practices are associ-
ated with higher wages, changes in wage inequality and workforce composition,
using data from a survey directed at Danish private sector rms matched with
linked employer-employee data. We also examine whether the relationship be-
tween high-involvement work practices and employee outcomes is aected by the
industrial relations context.
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11 Introduction
In recent years, a growing literature has been concerned with the analysis of the char-
acteristics of so-called high-involvement and high-performance work practices (hence-
forth HPWP) and their impacts on rm performance.1 The "new work organizations"
originate from various intersecting managerial approaches developed in the 1980's and
1990's, the most important of which are the lean production model and Total Quality
Management (TQM). Centered on the concepts of employees' involvement, empower-
ment and autonomy, a typical set of innovative practices includes: self managed teams,
job rotation, formal arrangements to discuss production problems (e.g., quality circles),
rewards for employees' suggestions, performance related pay and information sharing.
According to a number of empirical works these innovative work systems are associ-
ated with higher levels of productivity (Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi, 1997; Greenan
and Mairesse,1999; Bauer, 2003; Cristini et al., 2003; Zwick and Kuckulenz, 2004).2
The channels through which these practices give rise to productivity improvements are,
however, not well understood.3 In particular, and this is our focus in the current paper,
the ways employee outcomes contribute to the productivity eects of HPWP have re-
ceived relatively little attention, thereby leaving some important questions unanswered.
First of all, there is no consensus as to the extent to which employees gain nan-
cially from HPWP.4 This may reect the 'a priori' theoretical ambiguity as HPWP
1See Bloom and van Reenen (2010) for a recent survey.
2The existing empirical evidence is based either on case studies or on cross-sectional data; evidence
using more comprehensive data is fairly scarce. Exceptions are e.g., Black et al. (2004) and Kalmi
and Kauhanen (2008).
3While some studies have failed to nd support of HPWP as productivity enhancers (Freeman et
al., 2000; Cappelli and Neumark, 2001; Godard, 2004), others have shown that the mere presence
HPWP may not be sucient to improve the rm's performance and that factors like the lack of a
coherent bundle of practices, of complementary ICT investments, of adequate skills and of unions'
support, may hamper a successful adoption of HPWPs (Osterman, 1994; Black and Lynch, 1998;
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2002).
4On the basis of a nationally representative sample of US establishments, Osterman (2000, 2006)
2may have opposite impacts on wages (Handel and Levine, 2004). On the one hand,
a positive relationship between pay and high-involvement management may arise if
HPWP improve the rm's performance and employees can seize some of the higher
rent created. A related rationale is the eciency wage argument; in particular, a pecu-
niary reward may be used to overcome resistance to change; for example, supervisors
may be paid a wage premium to ensure that they do not undermine organizational
innovations which specically require them to act as facilitators of groups engaged in
problem solving; otherwise, these employees' groups may be viewed as a challenge to
the authority and job security of a supervisor (Black et al., 2004). On the other hand,
according to the theory of compensating wage dierentials, high-involvement man-
agement are expected to be negatively correlated with pay as the latter can be traded
o against more intrinsically rewarding jobs created by the high involvement approach.
Secondly, the impact of organizational innovation on within-rm wage inequality
has only been examined in a few studies. Again, the existing evidence is ambiguous
(Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999) and mirrors a theoretical ambiguous re-
lationship. On the one hand, the fact that HPWP are "skill biased" and associated
with a lower relative demand and higher layo rates of unskilled production workers
(Caroli and van Reenen 2001; Osterman 2000; Black, Lynch, and Krivelyova, 2004)
is the main reason to expect organizational changes to be positively correlated with
wage inequality. On the other hand, as long as organizational changes imply delega-
tion of decision rights to lower layers in the hierarchy, incentive considerations and
skill upgrading through training may lead to wage increases in the lower part of the
nds that the introduction of high performance work systems is positively associated only with the
wages of core blue collar manufacturing employees. Cappelli and Neumark (2001), using the Educa-
tional Quality of the Workforce National Employer Survey (EQW-NES), nd that some workplace
practices, specically benchmarking and total quality management, are positively related to average
labor costs per worker. Handel and Gittleman (2000) and Black, Lynch and Krivelyova (2004) nd
no wage impact of HPWP.
3occupational structure, thereby narrowing wage inequality within rms.
Thirdly, regarding the interaction between industrial relations setting and the new
system of work organizations, unions are generally expected to aect both the probabil-
ity of adoption and the cost of adopting HPWP. Whether unions and HPWP coexist de-
pends on two factors: the bargaining objects and the union's bargaining power (Machin
and Wood, 2005). The employer's costs of adopting HPWP depend on whether the
union supports or opposes the implementation of the new practices. By oering an al-
ternative to employee exit, unions' voice helps employers retain employees, a key point
for the success of high involvement practices for which employees' specic human cap-
ital is an essential contribution to the rm productivity (Freeman and Medo, 1984).
Thus, the presence of unions has a priori an ambiguous eect both on the probability
and on the cost of HPWP adoption.5
In this paper, we use a unique 1999 survey on work practices of Danish private
sector rms merged to a large matched employer-employee dataset, which provides us
with a wide collection of information on rm characteristics. Our dataset allows us
to overcome many limitations of the previous studies and shed some light on rather
unexplored research questions. In particular, this paper contributes to the literature in
several ways. First of all, it is the rst comprehensive study on the eects of organiza-
5Only few studies have investigated the role of unions in establishing a wage premium associated
with high-involvement work practices. Using a nationally representative survey of British private-
sector workplaces, Forth and Millward (2004) show that high-involvement management is associated
with higher pay and that the high-involvement management premium is higher where unions are
involved in eective pay bargaining. However, as the data used in this study are cross-sectional, it
is not possible to say whether a causal relationship exists. For the same reason, the estimates in
Godard (2007) suer from a potential endogeneity bias; Godard (2007) uses data collected in 2003
in a national survey of Canadian and English workers and nds that innovative work practices are
associated with meaningful pay gains for union workers in both Canada and England. Black, Lynch
and Krivelyova (2004) partly address the issue of endogeneity working with a small panel of 180
manufacturing establishments drawn from two rounds of the EQW-NES; they nd a signicant eect
of HPWP on wages and on wage inequality among unionized employers only.
4tional innovation, considering both rm performance and employees' welfare as relevant
outcomes. After exploring the relationship between high-performance work practices
and rm productivity, we also examine how organizational changes aect workers in
terms of wages, wage inequality and workforce composition.
Secondly, the longitudinal dimension of the register data enables us to estimate the
association between workplace practices and rm and employee outcomes, controlling
both for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and for time varying variables which
are not accounted for in cross section surveys. Neglecting unobserved xed eects or
time varying regressors, could bias the "true eect" of practices on rm performance
and on wages (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). For example, if rm's decisions to adopt
workplace practices are related to their business performance and the rm decides to
introduce organizational innovation in troublesome period (Nickell et al., 1996), then
the cross-sectionals estimated eect on productivity would be biased downward. How-
ever, the latter would be biased upward if, instead, employers are more likely to adopt
new workplace practices when times are good. To address these potential biases, we
rst obtain accurate estimates of the coecients of the time-varying variables using a
within estimator and then regress the average residuals on an index of organizational
innovation in the second stage (Black and Lynch, 2001). As a robustness check, we
also calculate the same eects in one step, using a xed eect estimator, for the subset
of practices for which we can exploit a longitudinal information.
Thirdly, the possibility to precisely measure the workforce composition character-
istics, such as the share of dierently skilled or aged employees, allows us to examine
potential omitted variables biases and to get closer to the true "average" eect of orga-
nizational innovation on the overall rm-level performance. Finally, we explicitly test
whether the presence of trade unions helps employees to appropriate a greater share of
5the rents associated with high-involvement practices.
According to our results organizational change is positively associated with rm
level productivity and employers do appear to reward their workers for engaging in
high-performance workplace practices. We also nd a signicant association between
organizational innovation and wage inequality, as managers get a higher wage premium
compared to non managerial workers. At the same time high-performance management
practices are found to be associated with loss of managerial jobs. Finally we do not
nd signicant dierences in the eects of HPWP between unionized and non union-
ized rms.
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The data are described in
more detail in Section 2. Section 3 presents the estimation strategy. Section 4 presents
and discusses the ndings and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
The data set contains information about Danish private sector rms with more than 20
employees and has been constructed by merging information from two dierent sources.
The rst source is a questionnaire directed at rms that contains information about
their work and compensation practices.6 The survey was administered by Statistics
Denmark as a mail questionnaire survey in May and June 1999 and was sent out to
3,200 private sector rms with more than 20 employees. The rms were chosen from
a random sample, stratied according to size (as measured by the number of full time
employees) and industry.7 The survey over-sampled large and medium-sized rms: it
6A description of the questionnaire and the main results are given in Eriksson (2001).
7In the nal sample, 46% of rms belong to the manufacturing sector, 10% to the construction
sector, 32% to the wholesale trade sector, 4% to the transport sector and 8% to the nancial sector.
6included all rms with 50 or more employees and 35 per cent of rms in the 20-49
employees range. The response rate was 51 per cent, which is relatively high for the
rather long and detailed questionnaire that was used.8 The survey represents a unique
source of information on Danish rms' internal labour markets and changes therein. In
addition to some background information, each rm was asked about its work organi-
zation, compensation systems, recruitment, internal training practices, and employee
performance evaluation. As for work design and practices, rms were asked to dier-
entiate salaried from non managerial employees.
The second data source is the "Integrated Database for Labor Market Research"
(IDA henceforth) provided by Denmark Statistics. IDA is a longitudinal employer-
employee register containing relevant information (age, demographic characteristics,
education, labor market experience, tenure and earnings) on each individual employed
in the recorded population of Danish rms during the period 1995-1999. Apart from
deaths and permanent migration, there is no attrition in the dataset. The labor market
status of each person is recorded at the 30th of November each year. The retrieved
information has been aggregated at the level of the rm to obtain information on the
workforce composition (i.e. proportion of men, skilled employees, managers, middle
managers, non managerial workers, and the proportion of employees with dierent
tenure and age) and the mean and variance of the hourly wage.9 Additional variables
collected from rm registers are size, geographical location, industry and some nancial
information for the years 1995 to 1999, specically: the value of intermediate goods
or materials, xed assets, and value added. Given our two steps estimation procedure
8We always take account of the complex sample design used for the survey by using the sampling
weights provided in the data-set; these weights being approximately equal to the inverse of the prob-
ability of selection of each rm into the sample. The response rates by size and one-digit industry
cells vary only between 47 and 53 per cent. Thus, the representativeness of the sample is of no major
concern.
9For the empirical specication where we use dierent time periods, we deate wages with the
consumer price index using 2000 as base year.
7explained below, we restrict our analysis to years 1997 to 1999, a compromise between
having a suciently large number of years to identify the rm xed eects and a short
enough time period to avoid too much variation in the adoption of work practices.10
Table 1 reports means and standard deviations of the variables of interest. At the
bottom of the table, we also report the mean and standard deviation of the variables
drawn from the survey, such as the dummy variable "unions" for local wage agreement.
2.1 Variables
The survey distinguishes between a few specic innovative practices: employees' in-
volvement in self-managed teams, job rotation, quality circles, total quality man-
agement, benchmarking, project organization, nancial participation schemes and on
the job training. Except for training programs and dierent nancial participation
schemes11, the survey also asked when each practice was rst adopted. Table 2 pro-
vides an overview of the diusion of the practices. Training and nancial participation
schemes are the most diused practices, involving more than 50% of rms. Team
working is also relatively prevalent (24%), while project organization and job rotation
is used in about 15% of the rms. Finally, only a small fraction of Danish rms oer
some form of employee involvement through quality circles (3%), benchmarking (4.8%)
and total quality management (6%).
The least diused practices, such as benchmarking and total quality management,
have been in place for a shorter period than more diused practices - like self-managed
teams and project organization; one interpretation is that rms introduce organiza-
10Table 2 indicates that most practices have been in use for more than three years, which suggests
that the triennium 1997-1999 is a likely period for HPWP not to change much.
11The questionnaire only asked rms whether they made substantial changes in their payment
systems in recent years, without being more specic as to when or to which payment system. Also,
there is no information regarding the proportion of employees involved in a particular work design.
8tional innovation gradually and that a sequential ordering of the practices may exist so
that some practices form the basis to others leading to the most advanced innovative
systems, as already found by Freeman et al. (2000). Consequently it is plausible to
assume that the number of practices adopted can serve as a proxy for the intensity
of implementation. Hence, our main measure of organizational innovation is a single
additive index of organizational innovation constructed as the sum of all HPWPs im-
plemented by the rm.12 We consider four outcomes: (1) the log of the rm value
added; (2) the log of the rm average hourly wage, overall and by three occupational
groups (managers, middle managers and non managerial workers); (3) the within rm
wage inequality measured, alternatively, as: i) the ratio of the average rm wage of
managers to the average wage of non managerial workers, ii) the ratio of the 90th per-
centile to the 10th percentile, iii) the ratio of the 90th percentile to the 50th percentile
and iv) the ratio of the 50th percentile to the 10th percentile of the wage distribution;
(4) the workforce composition measured by the proportions of managers, middle man-
agers and non managerial workers of all employees in the rm.
Table 3 reports the means of the outcome variables by the number of HPWP
adopted. We may notice that both the rm nancial performance and the wage in-
equality measured by the proportion of the average wage of managers and the average
wage of blue collar average hourly wages rise with the number of practices adopted.
The average hourly wage, the wage of managers and middle managers and the rm's
share of managers and middle managers as a proportion of all employees also rise with
12We also calculated two alternative indexes to measure the intensity of implementation. The rst
one is a weighted count index, the weights being the diculty parameters estimated from the Rasch
analysis (for more details, see Freeman et al., 2000). The diculty parameters associated with each
practice indicate that the most widely diused practices are also the easiest to adopt. This conrms
the hypothesis that workplace practices are adopted along an increasingly sequential path where the
easiest practices are the rst ones to be introduced, followed by more dicult ones. The second index
is obtained from principal component analysis. Results obtained using these alternative indices are
very similar to the ones reported in section 4 and are available on request from the authors.
9the intensity of organizational innovation. However, the relation turns negative for
number of practices grater than 4, suggesting the presence of non-linearities.
3 Empirical Strategy
3.1 Impact of organizational innovation on rm performance
In order to relate the rm's total factor productivity to the workplace practices,
we use a two step procedure (Black and Lynch, 2001) according to which TFP is rst
estimated using panel information and, in the second step, the estimated time average
TFP is related to the cross-sectional measure of HPWP. The use of panel information
in the rst step, coupled with a proper estimation technique, allows us to control for the
unobservable rm characteristics and cope with both endogeneity issues and potential
measurement errors.
The empirical specication of the rst stage production function is then given by:
yit = 0 + llit + kkit + zZit + uit; (1)
where the dependent variable is the log of the real value added, L is the log of labor,
K is the log of capital stock, Z is a vector of controls including rm specic employee
characteristics and a full set of size, industry and regional dummies. As pointed out
by the literature on the identication of rm production functions, the major issue
in the estimation of parameters is the possibility that factors inuencing production
are unobserved by the econometrician but observed by the rm. Specically, rms are
expected to respond to positive (negative) productivity shocks by expanding (reduc-
ing) output, which requires higher quantity/quality of variable production inputs. In
order to address this endogeneity problem, Olley and Pakes (1996) (henceforth, OP)
10suggested a semi-parametric estimation method that uses investment levels to proxy
for time-varying productivity shocks. Their strategy is based on the assumption that
future productivity is strictly increasing with respect to the investments, so rms that
observe a positive productivity shock in period t will invest more in that period, for
any value of capital and labor. Then, given specic assumptions about the produc-
tivity dynamics, OP suggest a two step estimation strategy whereby the coecients
of the variable inputs (labor, in the case of simple production function) are estimated
semi-parametrically in the rst stage and the coecients of xed inputs (capital) are
estimated in the second stage. More recently, Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) (hence-
forth, LP) have argued that rm investments, because of their lumpiness due to well
known adjustment costs, may not respond smoothly to the productivity shocks thereby
generating inconsistent estimated parameters. Thus, they propose to use intermediate
inputs to proxy productivity shocks.
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazen (2006) (ACF henceforth) have pointed out poten-
tial identication problems in LP rst stage estimation and suggested an alternative
two-step method that builds upon OP and LP approaches and circumvents the identi-
cation problem. Although with dierent specications, all three approaches share a
two-step estimation strategy which (i) ignores the potential contemporaneous correla-
tion in the errors across the two equations and (ii) does not allow for serial correlation
or heteroskedasticity in the error terms. In this regard, Wooldridge (2009) introduces
a more ecient alternative based on a single-step GMM13 estimation approach in line
with the ACFs correction and dealing with the drawbacks mentioned above. This alter-
native implementation estimates the rst and second stage conditions simultaneously,
capturing de facto the identifying information for parameters on the variable inputs
13The GMM system estimator due to Blundell and Bond (2000) is a suitable estimation method
in case of endogenous variables. It requires a long time span, since lagged values and dierences are
used as instruments. In practice, the presence of weak instruments is quite frequent.
11like labor in the rst stage (Wooldridge, 2009). Given the discussion above, Wooldridge
(2009) is our preferred estimation approach to estimate equation (1).
Using the estimates of production function parameters, the rm i's TFP, at time
t, is dened as
tfpit = yit   ^ llit   ^ kkit   ^ zZit (2)
Next we average the estimated tfp over the period 1997 to 1999 and estimate the
relationship between these and the index of organizational innovation in the following
equation:
tfpi =  + 1(index) + 2(unions) + r + j +  (3)
where 1 and 2 are respectively the productivity eect associated with the organi-
zational innovation and the presence of unions; t, r and j are regional, and industry
controls.
3.2 Impact of organizational innovation on employee outcomes
In the second part of the paper we are interested in looking at the impact of orga-
nizational innovation on employees' outcomes: mean hourly wages, wage inequality
and workforce composition. These variables are obtained from the register data, av-
eraging over employees' outcomes at the rm level. As in the previous subsection, we
implement a two-step strategy using the log of the employees' outcomes as dependent
12variables, exploiting the fact that we observe variables obtained from longitudinal reg-
ister data. In the rst step we recover the rm xed component of the residuals and
we use it as dependent variable in the second step, with the organizational index as
independent variable. This strategy should take care of any unobserved time-invariant
rm heterogeneity that might be correlated with the rm specic characteristics. The
two-step empirical specication can be written as:
ln(Yit) = cons + a(Xit) + uit; (stage1) (4)
ln(Yit)   ^ a(Xit)   cons = 1(index) + 2(unions) + r + j + ;(stage2) (5)
where ln(Yit)   cons   ^ a(Xit) is the average of the xed component of the residual
over the period 1997-1999, the vector X collects the rm specic characteristics, index
is our count measure of organizational innovation, unions is the dummy variable related
to the presence of the unions.14
4 Results
This section reports the main ndings for each outcome: productivity, wages, wage
inequality and workforce composition.
14We capture the presence of the unions by looking at whether the rm has a local collective
agreement concerning wages and working hours for all employees. Note that union membership is
internationally high in Denmark, as over 80 per cent of wage earners are trade union members. So
the measure we use in this paper is picking up strong presence of unions at the workplace level.
134.1 Financial performance
The rst column of Table 4 reports the results for TFP using the two step procedure
described in section 3.1. From the rst stage, labor elasticity is 0.74 and capital elas-
ticity is 0.11, conrming previous studies (Parrotta and Pozzoli, 2010; Parrotta et al.
2010). As far as the workforce characteristics are concerned, the proportion of em-
ployees with a tenure less than two years, the proportion of employees with a tertiary
and secondary education and the proportion of men are all statistically signicant and
carry a positive sign. The results also show that productivity is lower in rms with
more young and higher with the proportion of prime age workers. When we examine
the impact of HPWP on productivity in the second step, we nd that the count index
is positively associated with total factor productivity, suggesting that organizational
innovation contribute to enhance rm performance. More specically, a unit increase
in the number of practices implies a 1% rise in total factor productivity. Interestingly,
we also nd that rms with strong presence of unions have higher productivity than
otherwise similar rms, while the interaction between the union dummy and the index
of organizational innovation is not statistically signicant, implying that the presence
of unions has neither a positive nor negative impact on the productivity gains from
HPWPs.
Although the two-step procedure extracts the unobserved xed eect, other biases
may still arise in the second step due to the correlations of the second-stage regressors
with either/both unobserved, time-invariant, rm-level characteristics or/and the av-
erage idiosyncratic shocks because the time period over which we average is relatively
short. As we have information on the year of adoption for a subset of practices, we can
examine how the time variation of workplace practices is related to changes in produc-
tivity. We do this by estimating in one step a production function over a longer time
14period (1995-1999). Like labor input, the count index is now treated as an endogenous
dynamic input and instrumented using its rst lag.15
Results are reported in column 2 of Table 4: a lower and not statistically signicant
coecient is now estimated for the number of practices adopted. This result suggests
that the signicance of this variable in the rst column may have been driven by un-
observed qualities of the rms, we cannot rule out the possibility that it may also be
related to the fact that in the second column two important practices, i.e. nancial
participation schemes and training, are excluded from our count index. In support of
this we nd that the size of the coecient of the number of practices considerably de-
creases also in the two-step procedure when the above mentioned practices are excluded
from the count index.16 All in all, the estimates indicate that high performance work
practices are more likely to have benecial eects on productivity when introduced in
conjunction with training and nancial participation programs.
4.2 Wages
After showing that organizational innovation is associated with higher rm perfor-
mance, we next investigate whether innovative rms compensate employees for their
increased involvement in the production process and for incurring the risk associated
with nancial participation schemes. To answer this question, we estimate equation
4 using the log of the average hourly wage both at rm level and by three main oc-
cupation groups (managers, middle managers, non-managerialworkers) as dependent
variable. The rst four columns of Table 5 presents estimates from the two-stage ap-
proach. The relationships are qualitatively close to those obtained when estimating the
association between organizational innovation and productivity. An unit increase in
15Very similar results are obtained when the count index is not instrumented for. These results are
available on request from the authors.
16These additional results are available on request from the authors.
15the number of practices is associated with a 1.7% increase in the average wage. Hence,
workplace practices that increase productivity also lead to higher average wages.17
When we examine the average wage in each rm by occupation group, we nd that
the results are relatively similar across occupations. However, it seems that the pay of
managers is more aected than the pay of middle managers and non-managerialworkers.
This result is consistent with the notion that innovative practices increase the demands
on managers, as they are responsible for organizing the other workers and providing an
environment conducive to their participation in decision making (Black et al. 2004).
As in earlier studies on Danish data (see e.g., Buhai et al., 2008) we nd that higher
rm average education, higher proportion of male employees and of managers are as-
sociated with higher average wage. The presence of unions does not aect the average
hourly wage both at rm level and by occupation groups and its interaction with our
index of organizational innovation is generally negative and imprecisely estimated.
All in all, these results suggest that a wage premium is paid to managers relative
to non-managerialworkers to work in an HPWP environment and that there is not
a positive interaction between the union representation and HPWP. Unlike Black et
al. (2004), Forth and Millward (2004) and Godard (2007) we do not nd that strong
presence of unions in innovative workplaces provides additional wage gains to the em-
ployees in terms of higher wages.
Again unobserved heterogeneity can potentially aect our ndings, and so we es-
timate equation 4 in one step using a xed eect estimator and excluding nancial
participation schemes and training from our count index. These results are reported in
17Very similar estimates are obtained when wage and productivity are simultaneously estimated
using a seemingly unrelated regressions model. Results are available on request from the authors.
16the last 4 columns of Table 5. Similarly to the productivity equation, the association
between organizational innovation and wages gets weaker. However, the wage pre-
mium for managers remains large and statistically signicant, conrming that the pay
of managers is higher when they are working in a rm with some form of HPWP while
the pay of production workers is aected to a smaller extent. Thus, the results con-
cerning rm level wages show that productivity gains are shared with the employees,
albeit not equally across occupational categories.
4.3 Wage inequality
In order to investigate whether organizational innovation increases within rm wage
inequality, we look at: i) the ratio of the average wage of managers in a rm to the
average wage of non-managerial workers in a rm, ii) the ratio of the 90th percentile to
the 10th or the 50th percentile and iii) the ratio of the 50th percentile to the 10th per-
centile of the wage distribution. Table 6 presents results respectively from the 2-stage
and the longitudinal approach. The two-step ndings suggest that a higher number of
workplace practices increases within-rm wage inequality: for example, an additional
HPWP is associated with a slightly larger gap (0.5 per cent) between the average wage
of managers and of non-managerial workers. Alternative denitions of wage inequality
suggest that inequality rises more in the upper part of the distribution, conrming,
once more, managerial employees' pay is aected disproportionately more than that
of other employees. Union presence and its interaction with workplace practices are
not statistically signicant. As far as the main controls are concerned, the proportion
of male workers and of workers with a secondary/vocational education reduce wage
inequality while the proportion of managers and workers with a tenure of at least 10
years have a positive impact on wage inequality.
The results are, however, less robust when a one-step xed eect approach is im-
17plemented. Compared to the two-step results when the ratio of the average wage of
managers to the average wage of non managerial workers is considered, the association
between organizational innovation and wage inequality increases considerably. On the
other hand, the same correlation loses all its signicance, and even its sign changes, for
the other denitions of wage inequality are examined. Overall, it appears that the es-
timated relationship between workplace innovation and within rm wage inequality is
quite fragile, as it is highly sensitive to how inequality is measured as well to dierences
in estimation methods.
4.4 Workforce composition
Finally, to investigate whether innovative practices have any bearing on the rm work-
force composition, we estimate equation 4 using the rm level proportion of managers,
middle managers and non-managerial workers as dependent variable. The results are
given in Table 7. In terms of the relationship between organizational innovation and
workforce composition, there are two ndings worth noting. Innovative workplaces
have a lower share of middle managers and a higher share of non-managerial workers,
no matter which methodological approach is implemented. These results do not sup-
port the idea that organizational change is skill biased, i.e. that a variety of workplace
practices are associated with lower relative demand for unskilled production workers
(Caroli and van Reenen 2001; Osterman 2000). On the other hand, the estimates are
consistent with the hypothesis that organizational innovation is associated with a loss
of managerial jobs (Osterman 2000), i.e. HPWPs atten the organizational hierarchy
and hence reduce the number of employees at middle managerial levels.18
18For evidence of attening hierarchies and a discussion of possible causal factors thereof, see Rajan
and Wulf (2010).
185 Conclusions
Integrating existing research on rm organizational structure and performance, this
paper analyzes how the adoption of new workplace practices correlates with several
rm and employee level outcomes. The analysis presented here oers several advan-
tages over prior eorts to examine the relationship between organizational innovation
and organizational outcomes. Most importantly, the availability of detailed rm-level
measures together with the longitudinal nature of our data, allow to controlling for het-
erogeneity, thus signicantly improving on prior studies relying on cross-sectional data.
The diusion of new practices in the Danish private rms is found to vary widely
depending on the type of practice: while over 50% of rms provide employees with
training and nancial participation schemes, less than a fourth has employees working
in self managed teams, only 6% of rms follows a TQM approach and only 3% involves
employees in quality circles. According to this picture, comprehensive innovative work
systems are still quite uncommon in Denmark, as is the case in most European coun-
tries; nonetheless, the econometric evidence supports signicant relations between some
outcomes relevant to the workers and the extent of adoption of HPWP. In particular,
a unit increase in the count of practices rises the average hourly wage in the range of
1%-2%. Given the weak association between practices and TFP this reward is likely
attributable not to a sharing of an extra rent gained thanks to the practices, but to
considerations related either/both to the risks of nancial participation and layos
or/and to resistance to change type of conducts; both cases call for some form of
pecuniary compensation. Finally, the results according to which managers are those
that mostly benet in terms of wages and that middle managers are those most likely
to face reduced employment opportunities as a consequence of atter hierarchies in the
workplace, suggest that the adoption of HPWP has aected the job hierarchy in rms
19more than the rms' wage structures.
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25Table 2: Incidence and distribution of workplace practices.
Workplace practices % of Firms Years in Use
1-2 3-6 >6
Project organization 16.45 3.39 3.39 7.88
Benchmarking 4.81 1.35 1.65 1.13
Self-managed team 23.84 6.33 6.36 8.98
Quality circles 3.06 0.52 0.76 1.50
Job rotation 15.00 3.37 4.90 6.04
Total quality management 6.08 1.29 3.06 1.44
Financial participation schemes 55.01 - - -
Training 68.12 - - -
Notes: Weighted results.
Table 3: Mean of employee outcomes and value added by number of practices adopted.
Outcomes Number of practices adopted
0 1-2 3-4 >4
Wages
log(avg hourly wage), total 5.112 5.153 5.171 5.125
log(avg hourly wage), managers 5.648 5.782 5.808 5.825
log(avg hourly wage), middle managers 5.288 5.314 5.336 5.303
log(avg hourly wage), non-managerial workers 5.041 5.039 5.046 5.023
Wage inequality
log((avg wage manager)/(avg wage non-managerial workers)) 0.607 0.743 0.762 0.801
log((90th percentile)/(50th percentile)) 0.840 0.843 0.820 0.766
log((90th percentile)/(10th percentile)) 0.382 0.440 0.450 0.432
log((50th percentile)/(10th percentile)) 0.458 0.403 0.369 0.333
Firm employment shares
managers as a proportion of all employees 0.051 0.053 0.051 0.045
middle managers as a proportion of all employees 0.160 0.226 0.262 0.204
non-managerial workers as a proportion of all employees 0.590 0.551 0.524 0.607
Financial performance
log(value added) 10.227 10.732 10.818 11.333
N 194 858 289 70
Notes: All employee outcomes (wages, wage inequality, employment shares) and value
added are expressed as time averages from 1997 to 1999. Weighted results.






















tertiary education 0.834** 0.701**
(0.328) (0.319)
secondary education 0.279*** 0.282***
(0.054) (0.052)
share of middle managers 0.230*** 0.259***
(0.069) (0.065)














Notes: The dependent variable is the log of value added. All estimations also include a
constant term, regional, size and industry dummies. For the rst stage FE regression we
also control for year dummies. Production function estimates obtained using the Wooldridge
(2009) approach. Column 1: two-step estimates, the rst-stage is estimated using panel
information from 1997 to 1999. Column 2: one-step estimates using panel information from
1995 to 1999 and the count index excludes nancial participation schemes and training; the
estimations include a polynomial function of capital and materials and labor and the count
index are instrumented for with the rst lag. Weighted results. *Statistically signicant at
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